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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996 Supp.) . Following 
transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) 
(1996 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. ISSUES FOR REVIEW. 
1. Did the District Court properly dismiss Rawsons' 
claims of fraud, tortious misrepresentation, deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices, punitive damages and equitable 
estoppel from Rawsons' Amended Complaint pursuant to Defendants' 
[First] Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because of a lack of 
any evidentiary support therefor? 
2. Did the District Court properly dismiss Rawsons' 
claims of breach of warranty from Rawsons' Amended Complaint 
pursuant to Defendants' [Second] Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment because no legally recognizable warranties were made to 
Rawsons? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
This matter is on appeal from two separate orders of summary 
judgment issued by two separate judges of the Third District Court, 
both in favor of Defendants and against Rawsons. In reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, the appellate court views the facts in 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Mountain States 
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Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192 
(Utah 1991). In deciding whether a district court properly granted 
judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing party, the appellate 
court reviews the correctness of the trial court's conclusions of 
law. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 197 (Utah 1991). 
However, an appellate court may affirm the grant of summary 
judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is 
not the one upon which relief was granted below. Higcrins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 135 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 13, CHAPTER 11, CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
§13-11-2 Construction and Purposes of Act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following 
policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer 
sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales 
practices not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer 
protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the 
administrative rules, with respect to the subject of this 
act among those states which enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good 
faith comply with the provisions of this act. 
§13-11-4(2) [part] Deceptive Act or Practice by Supplier. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a 
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the 
supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction has sponsorship, approval, performance 
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characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if 
it has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is of a particular standard, quality, 
grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction is new, or unused, if it is not, or has 
been used to an extent that is materially different 
from the fact; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer 
transaction has been supplied in accordance with a 
previous representative, if it has not; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction 
involves or does not involve a warranty, a 
disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty 
terms, or other rights, remedies, or obligations, 
if the representation is false; 
§13-11-5 Unconscionable Act or Practice by Supplier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier 
in connection with a consumer transaction violates this 
act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is 
a question of law for the court. If it is claimed or 
appears to the court that an act or practice may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, 
purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is 
unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances 
which the supplier knew or had reason to know. 
§13-11-19(2) Actions by Consumer. 
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a 
violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class 
action, actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, 
plus court costs. 
TITLE 41, CHAPTER 3, MOTOR Vehicle BUSINESS REGULATION 
§41-3-404(1) Right of Action Against Dealer, Salesperson, 
Crusher, Body Shop, or Surety on Bond. 
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(1) A person may maintain an action against a 
dealer, crusher, or body shop on the corporate surety 
bond if: 
(a) the person suffers a loss or damage because of: 
(i) fraud; 
(ii) fraudulent representation; or 
(iii) a violation of: 
(A) this chapter; 
(B) any law respecting commerce in motor 
Vehicles; or 
(C) a rule respecting commerce in motor 
Vehicles made by a licensing or regulating 
authority; and 
(b) the loss or damage results from the action of: 
(i) a licensed dealer; 
(ii) a licensed dealer's salesperson acting on 
behalf of the dealer or within the scope of the 
salesperson's employment; 
(iii) a licensed crusher; or 
(iv) a body shop. 
(2) Successive recovery against a surety on a bond 
is permitted, but the total aggregate annual liability on 
the bond to all persons making claims may not exceed the 
amount of the bond. 
(3) A cause of action may not be maintained against 
any surety under any bond required under this chapter 
except as provided in Section 41-3-205. 
TITLE 70A, CHAPTER 2, SALES 
§70A-2-202 Final Written Expression - Parol or Extrinsic 
Evidence. 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of 
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a 
writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their 
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein 
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or 
of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or 
supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 
70A-1-205) or by course of performance (Section 70A-2-
208); and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended 
also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
of the agreement. 
§70A-2-316[part] Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. 
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(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as 
is," "with all faults" or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no 
implied warranty; and 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 56(c) Summary Judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, 
memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in 
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine 
issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 14, 1992, Clark and Conover attended an auto 
auction with the intent of finding a vehicle for Clark's family. 
Conover, who was a licensed motor vehicle dealer, purchased a 1989 
Ford Aerostar Van (the "Vehicle") in his business name of K&K 
Sales. The Vehicle had been "totaled" in an accident in August of 
1992 and was sent to "salvage." Clark and Conover intended to have 
Clark purchase the Vehicle from K&K Sales after it had been 
repaired and restored for his personal use. Until then title 
remained in K&K Sales. For a period of 10 months, Clark and 
Conover contracted with third-party contractors to restore the 
Vehicle. Upon substantial restoration of the Vehicle, Clark's wife 
test drove the Vehicle and determined that it was too long for her 
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use. Rather than purchasing the restored Vehicle, Clark agreed to 
find a new purchaser. 
Just prior to August 3, 1993 Clark showed the Vehicle to 
Rawsons and explained to them that the Vehicle had previously been 
in a wreck that totaled the car. Clark also told them that he had 
contracted for the Vehicle to be rebuilt and repaired by third 
parties and that he believed it was safe. He offered to allow 
Rawsons to have the Vehicle inspected by their personal mechanic, 
but they declined. Pursuant to their agreement, Clark had the 
Vehicle safety inspected and obtained a Certificate of Compliance. 
Rawsons purchase the Vehicle for $9,000 and executed three 
documents clearly acknowledging (1) the salvage and rebuilt nature 
of the Vehicle and, (2) the fact that the Vehicle was being 
purchased "AS IS" and "without warranties." The Certificate of 
Title given to Rawsons also included the statutory 
"Rebuilt/Restored" disclosure. 
Four months and 3,500 miles after Rawsons' purchase of the 
Vehicle, Rawsons were involved in another accident damaging the 
Vehicle. There are no allegations that any defect in the Vehicle 
caused the accident. After the Vehicle was declared "totaled" 
Rawsons filed a Complaint against Defendants asserting claims for 
fraud, tortious misrepresentations, breach of warranty, breach of 
covenant of good faith, deceptive sales practices, punitive damages 
and equitable estoppel. Defendants denied any liability based on 
the written instruments executed by Rawsons and on Defendants' lack 
of culpability on the other counts. On May 31, 1996, Defendants 
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filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was briefed and argued by 
counsel before the Honorable Pat B. Brian. Judge Brian entered an 
order on October 4, 1996 dismissing all claims except those for 
breach of warranty and the claim against the surety. 
Following Judge Brian's Order, the matter was transferred to 
the Honorable Glen K. Iwasaki. Defendants took the depositions of 
Rawsons to discover the extent and basis for their warranty claims. 
Based on the new deposition testimony on March 8, 1998, Defendants 
renewed their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that no 
express warranties had been made and that all implied warranties 
had been knowingly waived. The motion was again briefed and argued 
by counsel. On May 28, 1998, Judge Iwasaki issued on Order 
dismissing the remainder of Rawsons' Complaint. On or about June 
23, 1998 Rawsons filed their Notice of Appeal on both Judge Brians' 
Order and Judge Iwasaki's Order. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In the Statement of Facts section of the Brief of Appellants 
(hereinafter "Appellants' Brief"), numerous statements of "facts" 
are listed, most of which are argumentative and conclusory rather 
than objectively factual in nature. Furthermore, Defendants have 
serious dispute with the accuracy of many of said "facts" and have 
discovered that the Record citations used in Appellants' Brief are 
generally misleading and in many cases unsupported. Therefore 
Defendants submit the following Statement of Facts as supported by 
the Record. 
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1. K & K Sales was the trade name of a business owned and 
operated by Kim Edward Conover (hereinafter "Conover"). (R. 184, % 
2) . 
2. Paul W. Clark (hereinafter "Clark") is a commercial air 
pilot and has never been an employee of Conover, K & K Sales, or K 
& K Sales, Inc. (R. 185, H 4; R. 200, % 2; Deposition of Clark, 
R. 398-399, page 4 line 19 through page 6 line 22). 
3. On or about October 14, 1992, Defendants Paul W. Clark 
(hereinafter "Clark") and Conover attended an auto auction, at 
which time Conover, through his business entity, K & K Sales, 
purchased for Clark from Western Auto Wrecking, Inc., a "salvage" 
1989 Ford Aerostar Van motor Vehicle (the "Vehicle"). (R. 201, K 
3; R. 185, U1 6,7). 
4. At the time of the purchase, Clark and Conover were 
informed that the Vehicle had suffered structural damage in an 
accident occurring in August 1992. (R. 185, %8; R. 201, 1 4). 
5. It was the intent of Clark and Conover to have Clark 
purchase the Vehicle from K & K Sales after it was repaired and 
restored for the personal and family use of Clark's wife. Title 
remained in the name of K & K Sales throughout the repair period. 
(R. 185-186, 1 9; R. 201, 1) 5) . 
6. Over the next 10 months subsequent to the acquisition of 
the Vehicle, Clark and Conover contracted with various professional 
parts and repair shops, licensed to perform such work, for the 
restoration of the Vehicle. (R. 186, 1 10; R. 210, K 6). 
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7. Neither Clark nor Conover performed any of the body work 
or structural repair work on the Vehicle. Neither did they 
supervise the work or inspect the Vehicle while the repair work was 
in process. (R. 186, H 11; R. 201, % 7). 
8. Upon substantial completion of the repairs to the 
Vehicle, Mrs. Clark test drove the Vehicle, and determined that it 
was too long for her to easily maneuver, and did not want to keep 
the Vehicle. (R. 186, 1 12; R. 201, 1 8). 
9. In lieu of taking title to the Vehicle from K & K Sales, 
Clark agreed to obtain a purchaser for the Vehicle. (R. 186, % 
13) . 
10. Prior to August 3, 1993, Clark showed the Vehicle and 
offered to sell same to Rawsons. (R. 201, H 9; Deposition of James 
Rawson, R. 360-361, page 10 line 1 through page 16 line 20). 
11. Prior to the sale of the Vehicle to Rawsons, Clark 
verbally explained to them that the Vehicle had been involved in an 
accident and was rebuilt from salvage. (R. 202, % 10; Deposition 
of James Rawson, R. 361, page 13 line 3 through page 14 line 25). 
12. Prior to their purchase of the Vehicle, Rawsons knowingly 
acknowledged in writing that the Vehicle was a rebuilt salvage 
Vehicle with the following instruments: 
a. The Dealer Registration Record dated August 3, 1993 
and signed by James K. Rawson, Trustee, provides that the 
"Evidence of Ownership" would be by a "Utah Salvage Title" and 
that the transaction was of a "Rebuilt" Vehicle (Appellants' 
Addendum B, page 5 (more legible at R. 207)); 
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b. The Purchase Agreement (referred to by Appellants' 
as "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale") dated August 4, 1993 and 
signed by James K. Rawson, Trustee, provides that "Vehicle is 
a rebuilt salvage", that "The Vehicle covered by this 
agreement may be a rebuilt or restored Vehicle as defined by 
U.C.A. §41-1-36.5(1) and § 41-1-36.6 (9) . Purchaser 
acknowledges that this has been disclosed and that purchaser 
has seen the previous title or salvage certificate", that 
"Purchaser warrants that he has inspected the Vehicle to his 
satisfaction and purchases the Vehicle 'AS IS'" and that "The 
Vehicle is sold AS IS and purchaser is solely responsible for 
making necessary inspections". (Appellants' Addendum B, pages 
1-2 (more legible at R. 208-209)). 
c. The Buyers Guide dated August 4, 1993 and signed by 
James K. Rawson, Trustee, provides "Vehicle is a rebuilt 
salvage title", that the Vehicle was being sold "AS IS - NO 
WARRANTY YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer 
assumes no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any 
oral statements about the Vehicle." The Buyers Guide also 
includes a % page itemizing "major defects" which could occur, 
which include: "Frame & Body: Frame-cracks, corrective welds, 
or rusted through" and "Suspension: ... Structural parts bent 
or damaged...". (Appellants' Addendum B, pages 3-4 (more 
legible at R. 210-211)). 
(Deposition of James Rawson, R. 362-365, page 18 line 1 through 
page 32 line 19). 
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13. Clark gave a copy of each of the foregoing documents to 
Rawsons upon completion of the sale. (R. 187, % 15(c); R. 203, % 
11(c). 
14. Prior to the purchase and sale of the Vehicle, Clark 
offered Rawsons the opportunity to take the Vehicle to an auto 
repair shop of their choice, so long as Clark could accompany the 
Vehicle. Rawsons declined the offer. (R. 203, % 12; Deposition of 
James Rawson, R. 361, page 14 line 17 through page 15 line 9; 
Deposition of Rebecca Rawson R. 371, page 17 line 23 through page 
18 line 25). 
15. Prior to the purchase and sale of the Vehicle, Clark 
obtained a State Safety Inspection of the Vehicle, pursuant to 
which a Certificate of Compliance was provided by Burt Brothers 
Tire & Service located in Bountiful, Utah. (R. 203, H 13; R. 213) . 
16. According to Rawsons, neither Clark nor Conover made any 
affirmative warranties or representations concerning the Vehicle 
other than (1) the Vehicle had been in an accident; (2) the Vehicle 
had been repaired; and (3) the Vehicle was safe for normal use. 
(Deposition of James Rawson, R. 366, page 33 line 11 through page 
36 line 20; Deposition of Rebecca Rawson, R. 406, page 19 line 4 
through page 19) . 
17. Neither Clark nor Conover had any actual knowledge or 
reason to know of any defects in the repairs which had been 
performed to the Vehicle. (R. 187, 1)16; R. 203, % 14) . 
18. The title given to Rawsons upon the sale of the Vehicle 
was marked "REBUILT/RESTORED" on four lines in full compliance with 
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the Utah Statute on Salvaged Vehicles, U.C.A. § 41-la-1004 (2) . (R. 
187-188, H 17; R. 203, 1 15; R. 318). 
19. Following the purchase of the Vehicle by Rawsons, the 
Rawsons used the Vehicle for approximately four months, driving 
same approximately 3,500 miles, without complaint. (R. 179; 
Transcript of Proceeding, R. 455 page 12). 
20. On or about December 11, 1993, Rawsons were in an 
automobile accident near Kanesville, Utah, which accident was in no 
part caused any defect to the Vehicle. (R. 179; Transcript of 
Proceeding, R. 455 page 12) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Brian's Order dismissing all counts of Rawsons' 
Complaint other than those for breach of warranty and a claim 
against the surety was the only possible ruling given the limited 
evidence produced in opposition to Defendants' motion. Rather than 
specifying particular conduct of Defendants which Rawsons found 
objectionable, they opposed Defendants' Motion by generally 
asserting, without factual or legal basis, that Defendants knew or 
should have known that latent defects existed following the third-
party repairs of the Vehicle. No specific violations of the 
generally cited Utah statutes, and no particular conduct Defendants 
identified was in either the Amended Complaint or the resistance to 
Summary Judgment. Rule 56(c) required Judge Brian to dismiss all 
claims other than those relating to alleged warranties ambiguously 
raised by Rawsons. 
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Even reviewing the new factual issues raised for the first 
time on this Appeal, Rawsons have failed to show by the Record that 
the Defendants (1) have violated any of the provisions of the Utah 
Sales Practices Act, the Utah Motor Vehicle Regulatory Act or the 
Utah Consumer Code, or (2) have caused any damage to Rawsons as a 
consequence of said alleged violations. The damages suffered by 
Rawsons, if any, were caused by an accident unrelated to Defendants 
or any alleged latent defect in the Vehicle. 
Rawsons' deposition testimony unambiguously removes any claim 
of breach of warranty by Defendants. Rawsons both acknowledged 
their clear understanding that the Vehicle they were going to 
purchase (1) had been in an accident totaling the Vehicle and 
causing structural damage, (2) was being sold "as is" and "without 
warranty" and (3) had been repaired by licensed independent third-
party contractors. The parol evidence rule and the unambiguous 
integration clause in the Purchase Agreement prohibit Rawsons from 
avoiding the clear disclaims of warranty. 
Rawsons have consistently attempted to avoid the legal effect 
of the acknowledgements, waivers and consents freely and knowingly 
signed by Rawsons, but have failed to provide legal support of 
those attempts. Full and complete disclosure by Defendants, 
together with their exacting compliance with Federal Trade 
Commission's regulations and the Utah Salvage Vehicle statutes 
correctly place the risk of Rawsons' loss back upon Rawsons. 
The Orders of Judge Brian and Judge Iwasaki dismissing 
Rawsons' claims should be affirmed by this Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED RAWSONS' UNSUPPORTED 
CLAIMS IN ITS ORDER OF OCTOBER 4, 1996. 
In their Amended Complaint, Rawsons alleged eight separate 
causes of action: 
Count I: Intent to Defraud; 
Count II: Tortious Misrepresentations; 
Count III: Deceptive and Unconscionable Acts and Practices; 
Count IV: Reach of Express and Implied Warranty; 
Count V: Breach of Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; 
Count VI: Liability of Old Republic [Surety liability]; 
Count VII: Punitive Damages [Exempting Old Republic]; and 
Count VIII: Equitable Estoppel. 
Only in Count III, did they make even general claims that the 
Defendants had violated the provisions of one federal and several 
state statutes: (1) Federal Vehicle Information and Cost Savings 
Act [U.S.C. §§ 1980, et seg.l; (2) Utah Consumer Sales Practices 
Act [Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seg.l (hereinafter the "Sale 
Practices Act"); (3) Utah Motor Vehicle [Business Regulation] Act 
[Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-3-101 et sea.] (hereinafter the "Motor 
Vehicle Reg. Act") ; and (4) Utah Commercial Code [Utah Code Ann. §§ 
70A-2-101 et sea.] (hereinafter the "UCC"). No specific statutory 
citation was given by Rawsons concerning any particular allegation 
in the Amended Complaint, nor in any of their opposition memoranda 
filed in response to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Rather, the title to each statutory act cited by Rawsons 
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constituted the entirety of the description of the specific 
standards allegedly breached by Defendants. 
According to all of Rawsons' pleadings filed prior to the 
issuance of the District Court's dismissal Orders, the Defendants' 
conduct which allegedly violated some or all of the above 
referenced statutes creating the causes of action as described in 
the Amended Complaint was limited to the following: 
(1) Causing the Vehicle to be repaired in a defective and 
dangerous manner; 
(2) Misrepresenting to Rawsons that the Vehicle had been 
properly repaired; 
(3) Failing to disclose to Rawsons that the Vehicle had 
suffered severe structural damage in a prior accident; and 
(4) Misrepresenting the actual mileage of the Vehicle which 
was allegedly different from that set forth on the odometer.1 
No other facts, allegations, or implications were offered by 
Rawsons that Defendants had done any other act which constituted a 
violation of any of their cited statutory Acts. 
In the Appellants' Brief, for the first time in this 
litigation, Rawsons now attempt to allege other conduct of 
Defendants which if proven accurate may constitute technical 
violations of one or more of the generally cited statutory Acts. 
Rawsons are not entitled to raise such allegations and claims at 
1
 By earlier Stipulation and Order of the District Court 
the allegations and claims concerning the violation of any of the 
provisions of the Federal Motor Vehicle and Cost Savings Act of 
1972 were dismissed, and are not the subject of this appeal. 
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this point in the judicial process. "It is black-letter law that 
an appellate court will not address issues raised for the first 
time on appeal except in extraordinary circumstances . . . . " State 
v. Smith, 866 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah 1993). That "black-letter" law 
is equally applicable in civil as well as criminal cases. See 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); DeVore v. IHC 
Hospitals, 884 P.2d 1246, 1250-1251 (Utah 1994). 
A. Rawsons failed to introduce any factual evidence to 
support their claim that Defendants violated the Sales Practices 
Act. 
The Sales Practices Act provides for the potential private 
enforcement of any violation of the Act, including the possible 
collection of a reasonable attorney's fee. Utah Code Ann. § 13-
11-19 (1996 Repl.) However, in order to recover, the plaintiff 
must show that the conduct of a "supplier" constituted either a 
deceptive or unconscionable act and that such conduct "results" in 
a loss suffered by a consumer. 
Until the filing of their Appellants' Brief Rawsons had failed 
to specify which if any of the specific "deceptive" descriptions 
set forth in the Act fit the alleged conduct identified in the 
Amended Complaint. Through the new assertions of the Brief, 
Defendants know understand that Rawsons rely on subsections (a) , 
(b), (c), (e), and (j) of Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4. 
The fact that at the time of Rawsons' purchase the Vehicle was 
"used," "rebuilt," and "salvage" was acknowledged in writing by 
Rawsons on three separate documents. (Appellants' Addendum, pages 
1-2, 3-4, 5). Both Rawsons acknowledged in their respective 
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depositions that they were informed of the salvage and rebuilt 
nature of the Vehicle prior to their purchase. (Deposition of 
James Rawson, R. 3 61, page 13 line 3 through page 14 line 11; 
Deposition of Rebecca Rawson, R. 370, page 16 lines 6 through 14) . 
Any allegations that the standard, grade, or quality of the Vehicle 
were misrepresented are without factual basis and of dubious 
integrity. Clearly, the language of the Buyers Guide delivered to 
Rawsons, "AS IS - NO WARRANTY" should absolve Defendants from any 
liability for failure to disclose Defendants' intent not to provide 
a warranty for the Vehicle. There are no provisions of the Act 
that describe Defendants' conduct about which Rawsons complain -
the failure to know and disclose the quality of the repairs which 
were made to the Vehicle by independent commercial third parties. 
If the actions of Defendants don't fit within the description of 
"deceptive" conduct, it would be illogical to label them as 
"unconscionable" under section 5 of the act. Whether or not an act 
is unconscionable is a question of law for the court. That 
determination was properly made by the District Court after 
consideration of the setting, purpose and effect of the 
transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2). 
It is important to review all of the purposes of the Sales 
Practices Act in construing the conduct of suppliers as violative 
thereof. Section 13-11-2 provides: 
This Act shall be construed liberally to promote the 
following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing 
consumer sales practices; 
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(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales 
practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices 
not inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act relating to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative 
rules, with respect to the subject of this act among the 
states which enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith 
comply with the provisions of this act. 
(Emphasis added.) According to the statute itself, the Sales 
Practices Act was adopted by the State of Utah to protect suppliers 
as well as consumers in a way which is not inconsistent with the 
federal consumer protection laws and regulations. 
The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated certain rules 
concerning the sale of used motor Vehicles that is applicable in 
Utah generally and to this matter specifically. The form set forth 
in 16 CFR § 455.2(a) is exactly the form "Buyers Guide" which was 
used by K & K Sales in the sale of the Vehicle to Rawsons. 
(Appellants' Addendum, pages 3-4; R. 182-183.) That Regulation 
requires a dealer of used Vehicles to fill out, display and deliver 
a copy of the Buyers Guide to any purchaser of a used Vehicle. 
Defendants specifically and completely complied with the CFR 
requirements, specifying "AS IS - NO WARRANTY" and warning Rawsons 
of the "major defects that may occur in used motor Vehicles." (R. 
187, H 15(c); R. 203, H 11(c); Deposition of James Rawson, R. 364-
365, page 26 line 11 through page 30 line 17). 
In State v. GAF Corporation, 760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988), the 
Utah Supreme Court affirmatively declared that the Sales Practices 
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Act (Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-4) required an "intend to deceive" on 
the part of a supplier before a deceptive trade practice could be 
found. The 1995 change in language cited in Appellants' Brief 
chronologically followed the District Court's ruling in this case 
and is therefore irrelevant to this matter. Clearly there have 
been no factual allegations of nor attempts to show that any of the 
Defendants' intentions to deceive Rawsons. As far as "honesty in 
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned", there has been no 
allegation that Clark or any of the Defendants had any knowledge of 
any defect in the repair of the Vehicle prior to the sale of same 
to Rawsons. Rawsons merely assert (without any legal support) that 
as sellers of the Vehicle, Defendants had some unidentified duty to 
discover a latent defect. Rawsons have produced not a single case 
or statute burdening a seller with that responsibility. 
Without any factual allegations asserted and any evidence 
offered in support of Rawsons' general claims under the Sales 
Practices Act, the District Court properly dismissed all Counts of 
the Amended Complaint related to the Sales Practices Act. 
B. Rawsons failed to introduce any factual evidence to 
support their claim that Defendants violated the Motor Vehicle Reg. 
Act. 
In Count III of their Amended Complaint and in their 
opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, Rawsons 
cited the Motor Vehicle Reg. Act, U.C.A. § 41-3-101 et sea., as a 
statute which Defendants allegedly violated in the sale of the 
Vehicle to Rawsons through allegedly deceptive and unconscionable 
conduct. Identically to their general references to the Sales 
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Practices Act, prior to the submission of the Appellants7 Brief, 
Rawsons had never identified one act of Defendants which Rawsons 
claimed was violative of the Motor Vehicle Reg. Act. Accordingly, 
Defendants have always assumed that the gravamen of Rawsons' 
complaint was the allegedly fraudulent nature of Defendants' 
representations concerning the subject transaction. (R. 85-87). 
Section 41-3-404 of the Motor Vehicle Reg. Act codifies the 
common law tort of fraud in connection with the sale of motor 
Vehicles and allows for limited recovery against a surety of the 
dealer. To show fraud or fraudulent representation, it is required 
of Rawsons to allege that a false misrepresentation was made by 
Defendants concerning an existing material fact which was either 
known by Defendants to have been false or was made recklessly, 
knowing that they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
that representation. Marchese v. Nelson, 80 9 F.Supp. 8 80, 8 90 (D. 
Utah 1993) (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 
(Utah 1991) . The absence of any one element "is fatal to a claim 
of fraud." Jones v. Pingree, 273 P. 303, 305 (Utah 1928). 
Rawsons have never made any effort to allege or demonstrate 
the requisite knowledge required of Defendants to elevate 
Defendants' admitted non-statement (omitting to tell Rawsons that 
the repairs were defective) to a viable element of fraud. Lacking 
fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation, the claims asserted by 
Rawsons are not violative of the Motor Vehicle Reg. Act. 
Both parties admit knowledge of the accident to the Vehicle 
preceding K & K Sales' purchase of same. (R. 185, ^8; R. 201, 1|4; 
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R. 202, HlO; R. 361, pages 13-14). Both parties admit Rawsons had 
been informed orally and in writing that the Vehicle was a 
"salvage" Vehicle that had been rebuilt, repaired and restored. (R. 
202, HlO; R. 361, pages 13-14). The parties both acknowledge that 
Rawsons were given the opportunity to take the Vehicle to their own 
mechanic before purchasing it, and that neither party was aware of 
any defect in the repairs made to the Vehicle following the 
accident.2 (R. 203, 1]l2; R. 361, pages 14-15; R. 371, pages 17-
18) . All relevant information was fully disclosed prior to the 
closing of the transaction (Transcript R. 445 at pages 32-33) . For 
the reasons set forth above, Rawsons have completely failed to 
allege or demonstrate any fraud in the transaction. 
In their Appellants' Brief, for the first time in this 
litigation, Rawsons attempt to assert violations of Section 41-3-
210 of the Motor Vehicle Reg. Act. At no time prior to the 
submission of their Brief did Rawsons even cite the statute upon 
which they spend most of their effort in their appeals argument. 
Issues concerning the identity of the party who placed the 
advertisement for the Vehicle, the location of showing the Vehicle, 
and similar undefined allegations in the Brief (R. at 16) were 
neither raised in the District Court nor argued on Defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 200-213; R. 372-407). Such 
2
 Although solely for purposes of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the parties assumed that there were defects in 
the repair and restoration of the Vehicle; however, Defendants 
reserved their right to produce evidence at trial, if necessary, to 
show that the repairs made were in fact not below the standard of 
the industry and not dangerous to a passenger riding therein. 
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issues cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal. Park 
City Utah Corp v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978) . 
Furthermore, because at no time in this matter have Defendants been 
the target of a formal claim or complaint for violating any of the 
provisions of §41-3-210, Defendants have never admitted that any of 
their actions violated that statute. (Contra, numerous assertions 
in Appellants' Brief at 1, 3, 11, 12, 13 etc.) . Even assuming that 
Defendants had technically violated one or more of the prohibitions 
of §41-3-210, Rawsons have made no attempt to show that such a 
violation had a causal effect on any damages suffered by Rawsons. 
Section §41-3-404(1) limits the private right of action under the 
Motor Vehicle Reg. Act to circumstances where the plaintiff 
"suffers a loss or damage because of" the dealer's conduct. 
Not coincidentally, in their Brief, Rawsons failed to refer to 
the applicable statute governing the sale of "salvage" Vehicles. 
Section 41-la-1001 et sea, of the Utah Code governs the licensing 
and sale of motor Vehicles which have been "damaged by collision or 
flood or other occurrence." That statute allows the sale and 
purchase of such Vehicles rebuilt and restored to operation 
conditional upon the written notification to the purchaser that a 
"salvage certificate" or a "branded title" would be issued for the 
Vehicle. Such was the case in the present matter. With the Buyers 
Guide, the Purchase Agreement and the Dealer Registration Record, 
James K. Rawson signed instruments specifically designating "Utah 
Salvage Title," and "Rebuilt." (Appellants' Addendum 1-2, 3-4, 5). 
Defendants specifically and completely complied with all provisions 
22 
in the Utah Salvage Vehicle statute and Rawsons correctly omitted 
any allegations of violation thereof in their Amended Complaint. 
C. Rawsons failed to introduce any factual evidence to 
support their claims other than those concerning breach of 
warranty. 
In their Amended Complaint, Rawsons alleged eight separate 
causes of action: intent to defraud; tortious misrepresentation; 
deceptive and unconscionable acts and practices; breach of express 
and implied warranty; breach of covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing; liability of Old Republic [surety liability]; punitive 
damages [exempting Old Republic]; and equitable estoppel. In 
response to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment requesting 
dismissal of all claims, Rawsons submitted their memoranda 
contesting only the dismissal of Rawsons' claim for "breach of 
warranty" under the Utah Commercial Code. No contest or argument 
was made by Rawsons in the District Courts against Defendants' 
Motion to dismiss any other claims. Defendants and the District 
Court were left to assume that Defendants' argument as set forth in 
their submitted memoranda was sufficient to convince Rawsons, as 
well as the Court, that the claims based on fraud, tortious 
misrepresentation, deceptive and unconscionable acts, breach of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, punitive damages and 
equitable estoppel were without basis in law or fact. This Court 
should not hear argument now to these issues which was omitted in 
the District Court. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Federal Savings & 
Loan Assoc, 899 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 1995). In his Order of 
October 4, 1996, Judge Brian found that "[Rawsons] failed to 
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introduce any evidence" to establish a claim against Defendants 
under any of the above-referenced theories. (R. 287-290). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED RAWSONS' CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF WARRANTY IN ITS ORDER OF MAY 28, 1998. 
A. The disclaimer and exclusion of warranties found on the 
Buyer's Guide and the Purchase Agreement are valid and enforceable. 
Following the entry of Judge Brian's Order of October 4, 1996, 
Rawsons had two Counts remaining from their Amended Complaint: 
Count IV: Breach of Express and Implied Warranty; and 
Count VI: Liability of Old Republic [Surety liability]. 
In Count IV of their Amended Complaint, Rawsons generally cited the 
UCC as a repository of unspecified law which Defendants allegedly 
violated. In fact, the UCC, at Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316 (3) , does 
provide significant assistance to the issue of the efficacy of the 
disclaimer of warranty set forth on the Buyers Guide signed and 
distributed by K & K Sales. That section provides: 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is," 
"with all faults" or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of 
warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; 
It is not by coincidence that the specific language in the Buyers 
Guide includes the words "AS IS - NO WARRANTY" (Emphasis in 
original). Neither is coincidence that Rawsons failed to cite this 
provision in their Brief. This is also the language mandated by 16 
CFR §455.2 described in the discussion concerning the Sales 
Practices Act, above. That language is also well within the 
parameters of the general rule for exclusion of warranties in Utah. 
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In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 795 F.Supp. 1074 
(D.Utah 1992), the Federal District Court acknowledged Utah's test 
of whether a disclaimer of warranty is effective to remove implied 
warranties is conspicuous and unambiguous nature of the disclaimer. 
Such a disclaimer cannot be any more conspicuous than that found on 
the Buyer's Guide. (Appellants' Addendum pages 3-4). 
Defendants clearly and unambiguously informed Rawsons that 
there were no warranties and that if they purchased the Vehicle 
they did so understanding that they were purchasing the Vehicle in 
the condition they found it. In his deposition, Mr. Rawson 
testified that other than the three statements set forth in 
Statement of Fact No. 16 above, none of the Defendants made any 
"representations or warranties concerning the Vehicle." 
(Deposition of James Rawson, R. 368, page 41 line 18 through page 
42 line 4). James Rawson further testified: 
Q: Did you consider any verbal statement by Mr. Clark as 
a warranty to you concerning the Vehicle? 
A: No. 
Conover made no verbal statement to the Rawsons concerning the 
Vehicle. (R. 368, page 42 lines 11 through 14). 
In support of their attempt to avoid the clear disclaimer 
language set forth in the various written documents signed by James 
Rawson at the time of the purchase of the Vehicle, Rawsons assert 
that the parol evidence rule should be suspended to allow oral 
statements conflicting with the written documents. 
25 
It is important to first review the alleged content of Clark's 
representations. In his Affidavit, James Rawson states, "Paul W. 
Clark advised my wife and myself that the Subject Vehicle had been 
involved in an accident, that it had been properly repaired and 
that it was safe and adequate for our intended use as a family 
Vehicle." (R 252, 1 4). 
The written Purchase Agreement includes the language: "No 
agreement, verbal or otherwise, not contained in writing in this 
agreement on this document will be recognized." This type of 
integration clause is enforceable in Utah to exclude "evidence of 
terms in addition to those found in the argument." Bailey-Allen 
Co. , Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 190 (Utah App. 1997) . 
The parol evidence rule as set forth in the Utah Commercial 
Code provides: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory 
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set 
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms 
as are included therein may not be contradicted by 
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous 
oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade 
(Section 70A-1-205) or by course of performance 
(Section 70A-2-208); and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been 
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement 
of the terms of the agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-202 (1990 Repl.) . The integration clause in 
the Purchase Agreement places this written contract completely 
within the above statute. 
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Utah law is clear that to preserve the sanctity of a written 
document, the court will look to the four corners of the instrument 
to determine whether it is an integrated contract. Stanaer v. 
Sentenel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983) . In absence 
of fraud, an apparently complete written agreement will stand on 
its own, without any supplementation or parol evidence. Eie v. St. 
Benedict' s Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). The written 
agreement containing all three written instruments (Appellants' 
Addendum 1-2, 3-4, 5) in the instant matter is clear and 
unambiguous in its express intent to be an integrated instrument, 
and the integrity of the document should not be disturbed absence 
a showing of fraud, of which there has been none. 
B. The undisputed evidence shows that there were neither 
express or implied warranties made by Defendant to Rawsons 
concerning the Vehicle. 
Rawsons have cited several cases in their Brief concerning the 
recognition by Utah courts of implied and express warranties. 
Defendants have no argument with the law stated in any of those 
cases. Defendants do strongly object to the misapplication of most 
of those cases to the facts in the present matter. 
Defendants recognize that the sale of the Vehicle is covered 
by the UCC and that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
accompanies each similar transaction. Defendants also acknowledge 
that the extent of the representations allegedly made by Clark (the 
only Defendant supposedly making warranties to Rawsons) consisted 
of the following: "that the Subject Vehicle had been involved in an 
accident, that it had been properly repaired and that it was safe 
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and adequate for [Rawsons'] intended use as a family Vehicle." (R. 
252, H4) . Although Clark disputes even having made all of the 
preceding quote, Rawsons allege no other representations, 
warranties or puffing by any of the Defendants. (R. 368). 
In analyzing the three representations which are the subject 
of Rawsons' Amended Complaint, we find the first was absolutely and 
indisputably true. The Vehicle had been involved in an accident. 
The second representation, if really made, was at least partially 
true, and completely accurate to Defendants' actual and reasonably 
imputed knowledge. The Vehicle had been repaired by third-party 
licensed professionals and had been inspected and approved by a 
state-certified safety inspector. (R. 203, % 13; R. 213). The 
third representation was also true and accurate to Defendants' best 
knowledge. The Vehicle was safely employed by Rawsons for a period 
of four months and approximately 3,500 miles. The only evidence 
that Rawsons ever obtained to show the alleged unsafe condition of 
the Vehicle was discovered coincidental to repairs being performed 
upon the van subsequent to a second accident, which all parties 
concede was neither caused nor was in any way related to the 
original accident or repairs. 
In conflict with Rawsons' allegations of oral 
misrepresentations are the clear and unambiguous written 
disclaimers. In exact accordance with the regulations published by 
the Federal Trade Commission, the sale of the Vehicle was 
accompanied by a document entitled "Buyers Guide" which included 
the clear and obvious language "AS IS - NO WARRANTY" in bold 
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capital-letter type. The Buyers Guide also contained the following 
warnings to Rawsons also as required by the Federal Trade 
Commission: 
o "IMPORTANT: Spoken promises are difficult to enforce. 
Ask the dealer to put all promises in writing. Keep this 
form." 
O "YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer 
assumes no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any 
oral statements about the Vehicle." 
O "Vehicle is a rebuilt salvage Vehicle." 
O "PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE 
THIS Vehicle INSPECTED BY YOUR MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE 
LOT. " 
O "IMPORTANT: The information on this form is part of any 
contract to buy this Vehicle." 
(Appellants' Addendum, pages 3-4) . 
Although Rawsons' understandably don't like the language of 
the Buyer's Guide, they cannot eliminate its effect by labeling the 
document as "semi-concealed or obscured self-protecting". That 
document, the exact language set forth therein and the size and 
boldness of all lettering thereof were specifically established by 
the F.T.C. in its published regulations. 16 C.F.R. § 455.2(a). 
Of particular interest to the instant matter, by way of 
contrast, and not by similarity, is the case cited in Appellants' 
Brief: Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah 
App. 1987) . There the sales contract contained clear disclaimer 
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language which, if standing alone, would have effectively removed 
any implied liabilities from the transactions. However, plaintiff 
there alleged and certified by a sworn affidavit that defendant's 
agent had told plaintiff that the disclaimer "was of no effect." 
Without that allegation by plaintiff, which went directly to the 
issue of the validity of the disclaimer, the disclaiming language 
would have been enforceable and plaintiff would have been found to 
have failed to state a legal claim. 
In the instant case there are no allegations that any of the 
Defendants either minimized or asserted that the disclaimers in the 
Buyer's Guide were of no effect. Following the reasoning in 
Conder, the "AS IS - NO WARRANTY" language should be accorded its 
appropriate and understandable enforcement. 
In Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, 681 P.2d 1276, 1278 
(Utah 1984) , the Court stated that where the "disclaimer was in 
bold print on two different sales documents, one of which contained 
the limitation directly above the buyers' signatures", the 
disclaimers effectively limited the buyers' remedies. 
It defies the undisputed facts and the clear statutory law for 
Rawsons to now claim a breach (which never occurred) of a warranty 
(which was never in existence). Judge Iwasaki was correct when he 
found that, "Based upon those two theories, number one, if 
warranties were in fact made, there was no material breach, and/or, 
number two, based upon the context of the negotiation and the sale, 
the defendants are now barred from raising any warranties due to 
the integration clause as well as their understanding and the plain 
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unambiguous language as of the "as is" and "no warranties" in the 
buyer's guide." (R. 445, Transcript at 33). 
Finally, Count VI is completely dependent upon Count IV. If 
there is no breach of warranty, the surety can have no liability. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several contested issues of fact in this matter, but 
the determination of none of them were necessary for the Orders of 
Summary Judgment entered by the District Court. Because there were 
no genuine issues as to any material fact and because Defendants 
were entitled to summary judgment as matter of law, the District 
Court properly found (1) that Rawsons failed to introduce any 
evidence to sustain or support their claims of fraud, tortious 
misrepresentation, deceptive and unconscionable acts, breach of 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, punitive damages and 
equitable estoppel; and (2) that Defendants made no material breach 
of any warranties concerning the Vehicle. 
Defendants respectfully urge this Court to affirm the District 
Court's Orders on both of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
dismissing all of Rawsons' claims against Defendants. 
DATED this ' day of February, 1999. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
T. Rfichard Davis 
Attorneys for 
Defendants/Appellees 
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